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“Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I will tell
you what you value.”
Joe Biden – US Presidential Elections, September 15, 2008
1. Introduction
As income and wealth inequality have been rising in many coun-
tries during recent decades (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014),
policies to reduce income inequality have returned to the top of
the political agenda. Indeed, President Obama (2013) has called
inequality the ‘deﬁning challenge of our time’ and political disputes
over income redistribution have become more polarized and ideo-
logically charged. Republicans accuse the Democrats of ‘taxing job
creators’ (Romney, 2012), while Democrats often accuse the Repub-
lican Party of only cutting taxes for the very rich (Obama, 2015).
Debates concerning redistribution are also polarized in The Nether-
lands. Conservative-liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte (2012) con-
siders all left-wing parties ‘socialist’ that ‘destroy wealth’ by ‘ letting
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.002
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the government take away more than half of every euro you make’.1
Conversely, the socialist party has blamed the right-wing parties of
pursuing ‘neo-liberal’ policies that only ‘make the rich richer and the
poor poorer’ (Socialist Party, 2014). Similar examples can be found in
many other countries. However, despite heated political rhetoric, no
one has – to the best of our knowledge – ever tried to measure the
redistributive preferences of political parties.
In this paper we measure the redistributive preferences of politi-
cal parties by exploiting data on the tax-beneﬁt proposals of political
parties in their election programs. In a process unique in the world,
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) makes
an extensive analysis of the effects of election programs on public
expenditures and tax revenues, key macro-economic variables, and
the income distribution for every national election in The Nether-
lands since 1986.2 To conduct this analysis, all major Dutch political
parties voluntarily provide CPB with detailed policy proposals. CPB
acts as a disciplinary device by preventing political parties pre-
senting free lunches in their election programs. Moreover, CPB is
widely considered, by political parties and the media alike, to be the
single most important non-partisan judge regarding the economic
consequences of political parties’ policy proposals. The publication
containing the economic outcomes of the election programs, Charted
Choices, plays an important role in the election campaign. Politicians
use the ﬁgures from Charted Choices to back up their arguments in
election debates. Moreover, the election programs of Dutch politi-
cal parties are not cheap talk. CPB’s analyses of the different party
programs are the basis for the negotiations among coalition parties
forming a government after the elections. 92 percent of all measures
of the 2012–2017 coalition agreement were previously announced in
the election programs (Suyker, 2013).
By using the data supplied to CPB, we are able to reveal the polit-
ical preferences for income redistribution with the inverse optimal-
tax method, pioneered by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000, 2012).
For any given tax schedule, the inverse optimal-tax method derives
the social preferences that make that particular tax schedule the
optimal one. The main idea of this paper is that each political party
sets its tax system so as to optimize its political objectives. By
exploiting the detailed information on the proposed tax systems,
and assuming that Dutch political parties indeed optimize the tax
system according to their political preferences, we are able to cal-
culate political parties’ political weights for all income groups and
the non-employed. Thus, to paraphrase former Vice-President Joe
Biden, by showing their budgets, Dutch political parties tell us who
they value. Throughout this paper we speak of political weights of
the political parties rather than social welfare weights to avoid the
impression that political parties optimize a standard social welfare
function. They do not, as we will demonstrate later. Political weights
are analytically equivalent to social welfareweights. However, politi-
cal weights do not only tell us something about parties’ redistributive
preferences, but also about their strategic (inﬂuencing the election or
government formation) and opportunistic (gaining voters) motives.
We base our calculations on an inversion of the optimal income
tax model of Jacquet et al. (2013), which allows for both an intensive
(hours or effort) and an extensive (participation) decision margin.
We derive political weights from a structural model to address the
potential endogeneity of the elasticities, the income distribution,
and the employment rates with respect to the policy proposals of
1 In Europe, liberal parties are not left-wing oriented parties, but classical lib-
eral, pro-market, small-government parties that generally take conservative posi-
tions on non-economic matters. That is why we consistently use the terminology
‘conservative-liberal’ parties in this paper.
2 See CPB (2017) for the analysis of the 2017 elections, and the contributions in
Graaﬂand and Ros (2003) and the analysis in Bolhuis (2017) for the advantages and
disadvantages of this practice.
political parties. Our main analysis focuses on individual tax pay-
ers. We calibrate the model using detailed information on: i) the
earnings distribution, including an estimate of the Pareto tail for the
top; ii) marginal and participation taxes derived from an advanced
tax-beneﬁt calculator incorporating all taxes and transfers in The
Netherlands; iii) CPB-estimates of intensive and extensive elasticities
that are used in the calculation of the long-run economic effects of
the election programs. These estimates are in line with most recent
causal evidence of the elasticity of taxable income and participa-
tion elasticities in the literature, including those for The Netherlands.
The inverse optimal-tax method allows us to recover the political
weights implied by the detailed proposals for the tax system of Dutch
political parties in the elections of 2002. We focus on four political
parties that ﬁt into the ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ taxonomy regard-
ing preferences for income redistribution: the socialist party (SP),
the labor party (PvdA), the Christian-democratic party (CDA), and the
conservative-liberal party (VVD).
Our main ﬁndings are fourfold. First, our results show that politi-
cal preferences for redistribution are partly congruent with standard
social welfare functions.3 In particular, all parties roughly give a
higher political weight to the poor than to the rich and left-wing par-
ties give a higher political weight to the poor and a lower political
weight to the rich than right-wing parties do. Second, we detect an
important and robust anomaly in the political weights: for all par-
ties they are increasing from the poor to the middle-income groups.
This result arises from the fact that both effective marginal tax rates,
and the elasticity of the earnings density increase with income up
to modal income. Several other papers also ﬁnd that (for all house-
holds, for subgroups or for speciﬁc countries) social welfare weights
need not be monotonically declining in income (e.g. Petersen, 2007;
Blundell et al., 2009; Bargain and Keane, 2010; Bargain et al., 2014b,c;
Lockwood, 2016). Third, all political parties soak the rich by setting
the top rate of the income tax close to the revenue-maximizing rate.
Indeed, welfare weights are slightly negative in the baseline. This
is found as well in Petersen (2007) and Bourguignon and Spadaro
(2012). However, this ﬁnding is not universal. Since the Reagan
administration, US social welfare weights are not much lower for
top incomes than for average incomes, see Hendren (2014) and
Lockwood (2016). Similarly, during the Thatcher administration, UK
social welfare weights are relatively large for the highest incomes,
see Bargain and Keane (2010). Fourth, we uncover a strong status
quo bias in redistributive politics in The Netherlands. Speciﬁcally, the
differences in the political weights between parties are all small and
the political weights are close to the weights of the pre-existing tax
system.4 Therefore, we argue that the political process is important
in shaping tax policy outcomes.
We conducted several robustness checks. First, political parties
may have different views on the behavioral elasticities. Although
there appears to be little disagreement regarding the elasticities used
by CPB in the analysis of the election proposals, there may be ‘elas-
ticity optimists’ and ‘elasticity pessimists’ (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 554).5
In a robustness check we show that the ﬁrst anomaly – increasing
political weights to the mode – is completely robust to changes in
the elasticities. However, the second anomaly – negative political
3 It is typically assumed that social welfare weights are positive and monotonically
declining in income due to positive but diminishing marginal utility of private income
or concavity in the social welfare function (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012).
4 We show this for the 2002 elections. Bolhuis (2017, p. 110) argues that this is true
in all elections in which election proposals have been analyzed by CPB: “. . . the parties
hardly want to change overall government spending and overall tax burdens . . . com-
pared to the status quo”. Moreover, Gielen et al. (2009) demonstrate that marginal
tax rates barely changed between 2001 and 2011, implying that political weights
do not change much over time. During this period, The Netherlands had 6 different
governments and 5 general elections.
5 Bolhuis (2017, p. 30) concludes that “. . . the publication Charted Choices and the
analysis of the coalition agreement . . . are treated as ‘objective truth’ . . . ”.
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weights at the top – is sensitive to the elasticity of taxable income at
the top, and would disappear if the elasticity would be lower.
Second, we also verifywhether the results are robust to the unit of
observation.Thebaseline focuseson individual taxpayers.Weﬁndthe
same qualitative results when separately analyzing childless singles,
singleparents,primaryearnerswithoutchildren,primaryearnerswith
children, secondary earners without children, and secondary earners
with children. We further show that results are very similar if we
employ a structural model to fully account for the endogeneity of the
earnings distribution and the behavioral elasticities or if we employ a
suﬃcient-statistics approach where these are kept at baseline levels.
Finally, our ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of in-kind transfers,
such as subsidies for public transportation, culture, and arts.
Our main ﬁndings – increasing welfare weights to the middle, top
rates that soak the rich, and a strong status quo bias – suggest that
the Dutch democracy serves the interests of the middle class over
those of the low and high incomes. This ﬁnding can be explained
by political economics, and provides support to median voter the-
ories (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981),
citizen candidate models (Röell, 2012; Brett and Weymark, 2014),
Director’s law (Stigler, 1970), probabilistic-voting models (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000; Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2016), models of within-
party conﬂict (Roemer, 1998, 1999), post-election considerations
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000), and vested interests resulting in a
strong status quo (Olson, 1982). As such, our paper provides a bridge
between political economics and normative public ﬁnance.
Our paper is related to a number of recent papers that apply the
inverse optimal-tax method to derive social welfare weights.6 Pio-
neering work has been done by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000,
2012), who recover the social welfare weights for the tax system
of France. Subsequently, many studies have derived social welfare
weights: Petersen (2007) for Denmark, Blundell et al. (2009) for sin-
gle mothers in Germany and the UK, Bargain and Keane (2010) for
childless singles in Ireland and the UK over several decades, Bargain
et al. (2014b,c) for childless singles in 17 European countries and
the US, Hendren (2014) for the US, Lockwood and Weinzierl (2016)
for the US over the period 1979–2010, and Lockwood (2016) for the
US if individuals have present bias. Finally, Lorenz and Sachs (2016)
use the inverse optimal-tax method to identify Pareto-improving tax
reforms in Germany.
We make a number of contributions to this literature. First, to
the best of our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to apply the inverse
optimal-tax method to political parties. This allows us to objectively
measure their political preferences for income redistribution. We
argue that political considerations are key to explain our ﬁndings.
Second, we derive social welfare weights in a model with continuous
types, intensive and extensive margins and by allowing for income
effects. Earlier literature with both intensive and extensive margins
generally analyzed the discrete-choice model of Saez (2002) without
income effects (e.g. Blundell et al., 2009; Bargain and Keane, 2010;
Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012; Bargain et al., 2014c).7 Our simu-
lations demonstrate that the political weights are primarily driven
by the distribution of gross earnings and the tax-beneﬁt schedules,
and not by participation or income effects. Third, we extend the
analysis of Lorenz and Sachs (2016) by decomposing social wel-
fare weights into their main determinants. Under some simplifying
assumptions, we derive analytically how the social welfare weights
change with gross earnings, much in the spirit of the analysis in
Diamond (1998) on the optimal non-linear tax schedule. This is –
6 Studying the dual problem of optimal taxation has a long history in public eco-
nomics, see e.g. Stern (1977), Christiansen and Jansen (1978), Ahmad and Stern (1984),
and Decoster and Schokkaert (1989).
7 Hendren (2014) also analyzes continuous-type models with intensive and exten-
sive margins. However, his analysis builds on an earlier version of our analysis, see
Hendren (2014, p. 19, footnote 38).
to the best of our knowledge – new in this literature. Fourth, by
comparing our structural model with a model based on suﬃcient
statistics, we demonstrate that the suﬃcient-statistics approach pro-
vides an excellent approximation to the welfare weights obtained
from the structural model. Hence, the suﬃcient-statistics formulae
allow researchers to calculate the social welfare weights implied by
any tax system using data on the earnings distribution, tax rates, and
elasticities for earnings-supply and participation, without the need
to specify a full-ﬂedged structural model.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
optimal tax model, derives the expressions for optimal taxes and
social welfare weights, and explains the conditions under which the
social welfare weights are non-negative andmonotonically declining
in income. Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model. Section 4
analyzes the tax-beneﬁt proposals of the political parties. Section 5
derives the social welfare weights in the pre-existing tax system,
the political weights derived from the proposals of Dutch political
parties, and a number of robustness checks. Section 6 discusses how
political-economy and other economic considerations may explain
the patterns in the social welfare weights. Section 7 concludes.
An Appendix contains the proofs of the propositions, background
information regarding the Dutch tax system and the Dutch political
system, and the estimation, calibration and simulation procedures.
2. Model
This section introduces the model, derives the optimal tax system
and the formulae for the social welfare weights using the optimal-
tax model of Jacquet et al. (2013) with both intensive and extensive
responses to taxation.
In order to relate our paper to the existing literature, this section
derives all results using the terminology of social welfare weights. In
later sections, when we analyze the election programs, we will refer
to political weights instead tomake explicit that the political weights
are derived from a political objective function and not from a social
welfare function.
2.1. Individuals
Following Jacquet et al. (2013), individuals differ in their earn-
ings ability n, and utility costs of participation v. Both characteristics
are private information and their joint density function is given by
k(n,v) with support [n,n] × [v,v], where 0 < n < n ≤ ∞ and
−∞ ≤ v < v ≤ ∞. Earnings ability reﬂects the productivity per hour
worked, as in Mirrlees (1971). v is an idiosyncratic utility cost (or
beneﬁt), which reﬂects an individual-speciﬁc cost from participation,
for example foregone leisure time or household production, or the
cost of commuting to work, see also Diamond (1980). Participation
costs can also be negative, for example because of the value of social
contacts at work or by avoiding the stigma of being non-employed.
We will express all optimal tax rules in terms of the observable earn-
ings distribution F(z), with its corresponding density function f(z),
rather than in terms of the unobserved distribution k(n,v).
Employed individuals with ability n derive utility from consump-
tion cn, disutility from earnings supply zn, and disutility from partic-
ipation v. The utility function of a working individual with ability n
and participation costs v equals
Un,v ≡ u(c, z,n) − v, uc,−uz > 0, ucc,uzz ≤ 0, ∀n,v, (1)
where u( • ) is differentiable, increasing, and weakly concave in con-
sumption c and differentiable, decreasing, and concave in earnings
supply z. If labor earnings are the product of labor supply l and abil-
ity n, so that z ≡ nl, individuals with a higher ability n obtain a given
level of earnings zwith lower labor supply l.
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Labor earnings and employment status are veriﬁable to the gov-
ernment. Hence, the government can condition taxes and transfers
on gross labor income z and an individual’s employment status. The
income tax function is non-linear, continuous, differentiable, and
denotedby T(z),where T′(z) ≡ dT(z)/dz is themarginal tax rate. All net
labor income is spent on consumption c. Consequently, the individ-
ual budget constraint is c = z− T(z). Non-employed workers receive
a non-employment beneﬁt b, which generally differs from the net
income of employed workers earning zero income −T(0). Hence, the
non-employed enjoy consumption c = b, while they do not provide
any earnings effort (z = 0). The maximization problem for employed
individuals is given by: maxz u(z − T(z), z,n), where we have substi-
tuted the budget constraint in the utility function. The ﬁrst-order
condition is the same as in the standard Mirrlees (1971) model:
−uz( • )
uc( • )
= 1 − T ′(z), ∀n. (2)
A non-employed individual derives utility from consuming non-
employment beneﬁts b: v(b). Consequently, an individual decides to
participate in the labor market if her maximized utility when work-
ing is larger than the utility obtained from being non-employed:
un − v> v(b). The employment rate at each income level z equals
the employment rate at each ability level n in view of the per-
fect mapping between ability n and earnings z for workers: Ez ≡
En ≡
∫ un−v(b)
v k(n,v)dv. Ez thus depends on the joint distribution
k(n,v), the beneﬁt level b, and the tax function T(z). For later ref-
erence, we deﬁne the participation tax rate tz at income level z as
tz ≡ (T(z) + b)/z.
2.2. Incentive compatibility
The allocation is incentive compatible if the following ﬁrst-order
incentive-compatibility constraint holds:
dun
dn
=
∂u(c, z,n)
∂n
. (3)
This condition can be derived by totally differentiating utility
Eq. (1) with respect to ability n and using the ﬁrst-order condition
for earnings supply Eq. (2). The incentive-compatibility constraint
Eq. (3) does not depend on participation costs. Intuitively, a worker
with ability n has to incur participation costv irrespective ofwhether
the worker self-selects in the consumption-income bundle for type n
or decides to mimic a worker of type m to obtain the consumption-
income bundle intended for typem.
We use the ﬁrst-order approach using Eq. (3), assuming that
the second-order conditions are satisﬁed. Second-order suﬃciency
conditions for utility maximization are met if the Spence-Mirrlees
and monotonicity constraints are satisﬁed: d
(
uz( • )
uc( • )
)
/dn ≤ 0 and
dzn/dn>0 ∀n, see also Ebert (1992). In our simulations, we check ex
post whether the second-order suﬃciency conditions are respected,
which is always the case. As a result, bunching due to violations
of second-order conditions is not optimal for any employed indi-
vidual, and the ﬁrst-order approach indeed characterizes the policy
optimum in our simulations.
2.3. Government
The government’s redistributive preferences are captured by a
set of exogenously given marginal social welfare weights g for
all individuals, as in Saez and Stantcheva (2016). gz measures
the monetized gain in social welfare of providing one unit of
income to a particular individual with income z. Similarly, g0 is the
welfare weight of the non-employed. The average social welfare
weight of all working individuals at income level z is represented by
gz ≡
∫ un−v(b)
v gz,vk(n,v)dv/
∫ un−v(b)
v k(n,v)dv, where gz,v is the social
welfare weight of an individual with earnings z and participation
costs v.8
The government budget constraint states that total tax revenue
from individuals that are employed equals outlays on transfers b for
the non-employed and an exogenous revenue requirement R:
∫ n
n
∫ un−v(b)
v
T(z)k(n,v)dvdn = (1 − E)b+ R, (4)
where E ≡ ∫ nn ∫ un−v(b)v k(un,v)dvdn is the aggregate employment rate.
The government minimizes resources R in Eq. (4) by optimally
choosing the non-linear tax function T(z) and the non-employment
beneﬁts b subject to incentive constraints Eq. (3) and a distributional
constraint, which speciﬁes an exogenously given level of utility for
each individual, see Jacquet et al. (2013).
2.4. Optimal tax-beneﬁt schedule and social welfare weights
2.4.1. Optimal tax system
The optimal non-linear income tax and participation tax rates are
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal non-linear income tax schedule and the
optimal participation tax rate are determined by
T ′(z)
1 − T ′(z) =
1
ecz︸︷︷︸
≡Az
∫ z¯
z
(
1 − gz˜ + gz˜ T
′(z˜)
1−T ′(z˜) − fTz˜
tz˜
1−tz˜
)
f (z˜)dz˜
1 − F(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Bz
1 − F(z)
f (z)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Cz
, ∀z,
(5)
E
∫ z
z
fbz˜
tz˜
1 − tz˜
f (z˜)dz˜ = (1 − E)(g0 − 1), (6)
where ecz ≡ − ∂z∂T ′ 1−T
′
z > 0 is the compensatedelasticity of taxable income
with respect to the marginal income tax rate, gz ≡ −(1 − T ′) ∂z∂q ≥ 0
is the income elasticity of earnings supply with respect to non-labor
income q, fTz ≡ − ∂Ez∂tz
1−tz
Ez
is the participation elasticity with respect to
the participation tax rate when the income tax changes, fbz ≡ − ∂Ez∂tz
1−tz
Ez
is the participation elasticity with respect to the participation tax rate
when the beneﬁt level changes.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Eq. (5) is a simpliﬁcation of the original optimal-tax formula in
Jacquet et al. (2013). We contribute to their analysis by expressing
the optimal-tax formula entirely in terms of measurable suﬃcient
statistics. We also generalize the ABC-formula of Diamond (1998)
and Saez (2001) to include the extensive margin. Moreover, we do
not need to rely on virtual densities for earnings as in Saez (2001),
since we do not derive the behavioral elasticities along a linearized
tax schedule. If tax schedules are non-linear, the change in marginal
tax rates affects behavioral elasticities. To see why, suppose that the
non-linear tax schedule features increasing (decreasing) marginal
8 For example, if social welfare is given by a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function W(Un,v), where W′ >0,W′ ′ ≤ 0, then the social welfare weight of a worker
with earning ability n and participation costs v equals gn,v ≡ W′( • )uc( • )/k, where k
denotes the shadow value of public funds.
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tax rates with income, so that T′ ′(z)>0 (T′ ′(z) < 0). Then, a reduc-
tion in the marginal tax rate at some income level – keeping all other
marginal tax rates constant – results in an increase in earnings supply
at that income level. This increase in earnings supply is dampened
(exacerbated) if marginal tax rates are increasing (decreasing) with
income. Intuitively, as individuals increase their earnings supply,
their earnings increase, and they will face a higher (lower) marginal
tax rate if T′ ′(z)>0 (T′ ′(z) < 0). This change in the marginal tax rate
affects the total behavioral response of earnings supply to taxation,
and is referred to as the ‘circular process’ by Jacquet et al. (2013). We
take the non-linearity of the tax schedule fully into account in deriv-
ing the behavioral elasticities, see Appendix C.1.9 The intuition for
the optimal income tax expression is not discussed here, since it is
well explained in Diamond (1998), Saez (2001, 2002), and Jacquet et
al. (2013).
Eq. (6) gives the optimality condition for the optimal participation
tax in terms of suﬃcient statistics, which resembles the optimal par-
ticipation tax in the discrete-type model of Saez (2002). g0 −1 on the
right-hand side represents the marginal beneﬁts of raising the non-
employment beneﬁt b with one unit: the mechanical welfare gain
g0 minus its resource cost. The welfare weight of the non-employed
g0 is typically larger than 1, since the average welfare weight is
approximately one.10 Redistribution towards the non-employed is
more valuable if there are more non-employed individuals, i.e. if E
is lower. fbz
tz
1−tz on the left-hand side gives the participation dis-
tortion at income level z if the non-employment beneﬁt b is raised
with one unit. Some individuals stop paying taxes and start collect-
ing non-employment beneﬁts. Participation distortions increase in
the participation elasticity fbz and the participation tax rate tz.
11 Par-
ticipation distortions aremore important if there aremore employed
workers, i.e. if E is larger.
2.4.2. Social welfare weights
The inverse optimal-tax method asks the question: which set of
social welfare weights makes a particular tax system the optimal
one (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012)? The answer is found by solv-
ing the expressions for the optimal income tax and beneﬁt levels in
Proposition 1 for social welfare weights gz and g0 in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The social welfare weights associated with any opti-
mized tax system satisfy
gz = 1+
1
f (z)
∂DWLz
∂z
+ gz
T ′(z)
1 − T ′(z) − f
T
z
tz
1 − tz , ∀z, (7)
1
f (z)
∂DWLz
∂z
≡ (nz + hz)ecz
T ′(z)
1 − T ′(z) + e
c
z
zT ′′(z)
(1 − T ′(z))2
, ∀z, (8)
g0 = 1+
E
1 − E
∫ z
z
fbz˜
tz˜
1 − tz˜
f (z˜)dz˜, (9)
where DWLz ≡ ecz T
′(z)
1−T ′(z) zf (z) is the marginal deadweight loss on tax
base zf(z), nz ≡ ∂e
c
z
∂z
z
ecz
is the elasticity of the compensated elasticity of
9 Saez (2001) conjectures and Jacquet and Lehmann (2015) prove that the Mirrlees
model is applicable as well under preference heterogeneity. In that case, the elastici-
ties at each income level represent the averages of the elasticities over all individuals
at each income level. Hendren (2014) demonstrates that our model preserves this
property.
10 The average social welfare weight is exactly one in the absence of income effects.
11 Due to income effects in participation choices the participation elasticity of a ben-
eﬁt increase fbz is generally not equal to the participation elasticity of a tax increase
fTz . Both elasticities coincide when utility is quasi-linear or when participation costs
are monetary.
taxable income, and hz ≡ 1+ zf ′(z)f (z) denotes the elasticity of the local tax
base zf(z) with respect to income z.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Eq. (7) shows that the social welfare weights are based on suf-
ﬁcient statistics only: marginal and participation tax rates, com-
pensated and income elasticities of earnings supply, participation
elasticities, and the earnings distribution. Social welfare weights for
the non-employed g0 in Eq. (9) are larger the more the government
distorts participation, since participation is distorted only to redis-
tribute income from the employed to the non-employed. Note that
all welfare weights are equal to one (gz = 1) if marginal and partic-
ipation tax rates are zero. If the government does not engage in any
income redistribution through distortionary taxation, it must attach
the same welfare weight to everyone.
In the analysis that follows we are particularly interested in
whether social welfare weights are: i) monotonically declining in
income, so that the government always cares more about poorer
than richer individuals, ii) always positive, since otherwise Pareto-
improving tax reforms exist, and iii) feature discontinuous jumps,
so that large differences in social welfare weights exist for individ-
uals differing only marginally in income, which, too, suggests the
possibility of welfare-improving tax reforms.
Behavior of social welfare weights with income. The ﬁrst deter-
minant of the social welfare weights in Eq. (7) is the change of the
deadweight loss DWLz with earnings z. In our empirical analysis, we
show that this term is the main determinant of the social welfare
weights. ecz
T ′(z)
1−T ′(z) stands for the marginal deadweight loss per unit
of tax base at income level z, and zf(z) is the size of the tax base at
z. Intuitively, if the deadweight losses are increasing at income level
z, then the government redistributes from individuals with incomes
higher than z to individuals with income levels below z. Conse-
quently, social welfare weights for individuals at income z are higher
than for individuals above income z.12 The change in the deadweight
loss is larger if marginal tax rates T′(z) or elasticities ecz are higher –
for given hz and nz.
To gain more insight into the behavior of social welfare weights
with income, we follow Diamond (1998). We suppose that income
and participation effects are zero
(
gz = fTz = 0
)
.13 Our quantitative
results below show that these terms have a negligible impact on the
social welfare weights. Moreover, intensive earnings-supply elas-
ticities are assumed to be constant (ecz = e
c).14 The social welfare
weights can then be simpliﬁed to:
gz = 1+ hzec
T ′(z)
(1 − T ′(z)) + e
c zT
′′(z)
(1 − T ′(z))2
, ∀z, (10)
12 Alternatively, if the welfare weights are expressed in terms of the Diamond
(1975)-based social marginal value of income g∗z ≡ gz − gz T
′(z)
1−T ′(z) + e
P
z
tz
1−tz – which
includes the income and participation effects on taxed bases – optimality of the tax
system implies that g∗z = 1 +
1
f (z)
∂DWLz
∂z so that the Diamond-based social welfare
weights are only determined by the change in the deadweight loss.
13 Income effects on the intensive margin gz
T ′(z)
1−T ′(z) raise the distributional beneﬁts of
a higher marginal tax rate, and thus raise social welfare weights – ceteris paribus. Par-
ticipation distortions fTz
tz
1−tz can either be positive or negative depending on whether
the government taxes or subsidizes participation at income z. If tz >0, participation
distortions reduce the redistributional beneﬁts of a higher marginal tax rate, hence
social welfare weights are lower – ceteris paribus. The reverse is true if tz < 0.
14 If nz >0 the government attaches a higher welfare weight to individuals with
income z than to those above z– ceteris paribus. Appendix D shows that intensive elas-
ticities are roughly constant with income in our calibration. Hence, nz is approximately
zero and is not important to explain the behavior of the social welfare weights.
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and the change of the social welfare weights with respect to gross
earnings equals:
∂gz
∂z
= (1+ hz)ec
T ′′(z)
(1 − T ′(z))2
+ ec
T ′(z)
1 − T ′(z)
∂hz
∂z
+ ecz
(
T ′′′(z)
(1 − T ′(z))2
+ 2
(T ′′(z))2
(1 − T ′(z))3
)
. (11)
From this we see that the behavior of social welfare weights with
income is determined by two variables: the elasticity of the local
tax base hz
(
and its derivative ∂hz
∂z
)
and the marginal tax rate T′(z)
(and its ﬁrst and second derivative, T′ ′(z) and T′ ′ ′(z), respectively).
A higher elasticity of taxable income ec does not change the com-
parative statics, only their size. Hence, the patterns of social welfare
weights become more pronounced if the elasticity of taxable income
increases.
The behavior of the elasticity of the local tax base hz is the key
determinant of the social welfare weights. If hz is larger, marginal
tax rates generate larger deadweight losses. Hence, the government
attaches a higher social welfare weight to individuals with income
above z then to individuals at z – ceteris paribus. Fig. 1 plots the
behavior of hz against gross income for The Netherlands in 2006.
hz changes non-monotonically with income: it ﬁrst increases until
it reaches a maximum at around the 25th percentile, after which
it starts to decrease until it becomes a constant when the Pareto
tail starts (at about 60,000 euro).15 Fig. 1 shows that for the Dutch
income distribution, hz is larger than −1 up to the 50th percentile,
hence 1 + hz >0 until the median. In The Netherlands, marginal tax
rates also increase with earnings (i.e., T′ ′(z)>0) up to the median.
Therefore, the ﬁrst term in Eq. (11) is positive up to the median.
The second term in Eq. (11), the derivative of the elasticity of the
tax base, is roughly positive up to the 30th percentile, and negative
thereafter, see Fig. 1, where hz ﬁrst increases and then decreases with
income. Finally, the third term in Eq. (11) captures how changes in
the marginal tax rates affect social welfare weights. The contribution
of these terms is generally small, except around spikes in marginal
tax rates. Therefore, in The Netherlands one expects to ﬁnd social
welfare weights that are increasing up to at least the 30th percentile
of the earnings distribution.16
Negative social welfareweights. Whether social welfare weights
are positive is especially relevant for the top-income earners. Atkin-
son et al. (2011) show that the Pareto distribution with parameter
a generally gives an excellent ﬁt for the right tail of the income
distribution. If we realistically assume that participation elasticities
are negligible for top earners
(
fTz = 0
)
, and that compensated and
income elasticities are constant (ecz = e
c, gz = g, nz = 0), optimal
top rates are constant, and social welfare weights for top earners g∞
are given by:
g∞ = 1 − (aec − g) T
′(∞)
1 − T ′(∞) . (12)
15 The empirical earnings distribution is supplemented with an estimated Pareto tail
for the top income earners. If the earnings distribution f(z) is Pareto with parameter
a, then it can be written as f (z) = azˆaz−1−a , where zˆ is the income level at which the
Pareto distribution starts. Consequently, the elasticity of zf(z) equals−a if the earnings
distribution is Pareto.
16 Hendren (2014, Fig. 7) shows that in the US the elasticity hz ≡ 1 + f ′(z)zf (z) is nearly
continuously declining with income – except at the very top of the earnings distribu-
tion. Moreover, hz is much smaller at middle income levels. This explains why social
welfare weights in his analysis are always declining, despite the continuous rise of
the marginal tax rates with income. The Netherlands, in contrast, has a much larger
middle class than the US, so that welfare weights can be increasing.
Fig. 1. Elasticity hz ≡ 1+ f ′(z)zf (z) of the local tax base zf(z).
Social welfare weights for top income earners are non-negative,
i.e. g∞ ≥ 0, if the marginal tax rate satisﬁes T ′(∞) ≤ 11+aec−g . If the
latter holds with equality, marginal tax rates are set at the top of the
Laffer curve. Setting top rates beyond the Laffer rate is non-Paretian,
since a reduction of top rates would both raise utility for top income
earners, and raise tax revenue, which can be redistributed to make
other individuals better off (Werning, 2007; Brendon, 2013; Lorenz
and Sachs, 2016).
Spikes in social welfare weights. Social welfare weights display
discontinuities if tax schedules generate spikes in marginal tax rates
over small income intervals. These spikes are anomalous, since they
generate large differences in social welfare weights for individuals
differing only slightly in their earnings. The term T
′′′(z)
(1−T ′(z))2 +2
(T ′′(z))2
(1−T ′(z))3
in Eq. (11) captures the inﬂuence of spikes in marginal tax rates
on social welfare weights. There will be large changes in welfare
weights if marginal tax rates change a lot in narrow income intervals.
If marginal tax rates do not change much with income, this term is
small, since then we have (T′ ′(z))2 ≈ T′ ′ ′(z) ≈ 0.
3. Calibration
This section explains in detail the data used in our analysis and
the calibration of our model. We develop a structural version of the
model by calibrating the primitives of the Jacquet et al. (2013) model
to Dutch data. The reason to use a structural model is that the elas-
ticities, the income distribution and the employment rates are all
endogenous to the policy proposals of political parties. Failing to take
these changes into account could potentially bias our calculations of
the political weights, see also Chetty (2009). The downside of using
a structural model is that it may be misspeciﬁed. Therefore, we also
perform our analysis on the basis of suﬃcient statistics where we
keep elasticities, the income distribution and the employment rates
constant when recovering the political weights of the political party
proposals (see the robustness checks).
Appendix C shows that the utility function u(c, z,n), the joint
distribution function of ability and participation costs k(n,v), and
the allocation {c, z} yield the necessary information to calculate the
political weights associated with any tax-beneﬁt system {T(z), b}. We
identify the structural model by estimating the joint distribution
of ability and participation costs k(n,v) and calibrating the utility
function u(c, z,n) on the intensive and extensive elasticities used by
CPB in the analysis of the party proposals, and using the tax-beneﬁt
system in the baseline.
We make two important assumptions. First, we assume that
ability and participation costs are independent. Hence, the joint
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distribution can be written as k(n,v) ≡ kˆ(n)h(v), where kˆ(n) is
the density function of ability and h(v) is the density function of
participation costs. We invert the individuals’ ﬁrst-order conditions
to solve for their ability n. Then, we estimate a non-parametric kernel
regression for the distribution of ability kˆ(n). Second, we assume that
h(v) follows a non-standardized t-distribution, which we estimate
using data on employment rates by education and participation elas-
ticities by income. More details on the exact calibration procedure
can be found in Appendix C.
The remainder of this section describes the calibration of the
model: i) the earnings distribution, ii) the tax system, iii) intensive
elasticities, and iv) participation costs and extensive elasticities.
3.1. Earnings distribution
We calibrate the distribution of ability kˆ(n) by inverting the
individuals’ ﬁrst-order condition for earnings supply in the spirit
of Saez (2001). To do so, we need information on earnings, tax
rates, and elasticities. We use the micro dataset and elasticities of
taxable income used by CPB in the analysis of the 2002 election
proposals. The 2002 election proposals concern the cabinet period
2003–2006. We recover the political weights for 2006, the ﬁnal year
of the analysis when the full reform packages were projected to be
implemented.
The unit of observation is the individual tax payer. Later, we
explore the robustness of our ﬁndings for different household types
(childless singles, single parents, primary earners without children,
primary earners with children, secondary earners without children,
and secondary earners with children). Data on individual earn-
ings come from the Housing Demand Survey (HDS) (1998) – in
Dutch: Woningbehoefteonderzoek – collected by Statistics Nether-
lands (1999). HDS 1998 contains sampling weights, which we use
throughout the analysis. For the 2002 elections, CPB has updated the
income data from the HDS 1998 to the year 2006, which we use
as the baseline. We employ gross wage income as our deﬁnition of
income and restrict the sample to employees. Our data set consists of
29,229 individuals. Fig. 2 provides a plot of a kernel density estimate
of the earnings distribution, using a bandwidth of 3500 euro.
Since there are relatively few observations in the top tail of the
earnings distribution in HDS 1998, we replace the top of the earnings
distribution by a Pareto distribution. We use the method of Clauset
et al. (2009) to simultaneously estimate the starting point of the
Pareto distribution and the Pareto parameter, on the (uncensored)
Income Panel 2002 – in Dutch: Inkomenspanel 2002 – from Statistics
Netherlands (2007). The estimated Pareto parameter is 3.158 and the
estimated start of the Pareto distribution is 56,571 euro. The Pareto-
parameter for the skill distribution is then calculated as a(1 + eu),
Fig. 2. Kernel estimate of marginal tax rates (left axis), participation tax rates (left
axis) and the income distribution (right axis).
where eu ≡ ∂z
∂n
n
z is the uncompensated elasticity of earnings z with
respect to the skill level n (wage per hour worked), see also Saez
(2001, p. 222).
3.2. Tax system
The political weights are critically determined by the param-
eters of the tax system. Therefore, it is important to use precise
estimates for marginal tax rates and participation tax rates.17 We
calculate effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) and participation tax
rates (PTRs) using MIMOS-2, the oﬃcial tax-beneﬁt calculator of CPB
used in the analysis of the 2002 election proposals, see Terra-Pilaar
(1999) for a detailed description (in Dutch). To calculate the EMTR
we ﬁrst increase individual gross wage income by 3%. Next, we deter-
mine the corresponding increase in disposable income. Finally, the
EMTR is calculated as 1 minus the increase in disposable income
over the increase in gross wage income. MIMOS-2 takes into account
all relevant income-dependent tax rates, tax credits and subsidies
to calculate the EMTRs in The Netherlands.18 Furthermore, we also
include indirect taxes into our measure of EMTRs.19 According to
the input-output tables in the National Accounts, indirect taxes
on private consumption are 12.0% of private consumption in 2006
(Statistics Netherlands, 2015). We assume that indirect taxes – of
which the VAT is the most important one – are a constant fraction of
consumption, which equals net disposable income in our static setup.
Bettendorf and Cnossen (2014) show that this is a good approxima-
tion, since consumption of low-VAT and high-VAT commodities are
nearly proportional in net disposable income in The Netherlands.20
We use a kernel estimate with a bandwidth of 3500 euro to
smooth out the variation in individual EMTRs at each income
level, and across individuals at different income levels. Online
Appendix D gives a scatter plot of EMTRs showing that there is sub-
stantial variation in EMTRs at a given income level for a large part
of the income distribution. For a given level of income, EMTRs dif-
fer because income support is conditioned on other characteristics
than income, such as the presence of children, use of rental hous-
ing or health care, and outlays on child care.21 Fig. 2 gives a kernel
estimate of the resulting EMTRs. This and all other ﬁgures in this
17 Moreover, by precisely calculating marginal tax rates, we also improve on Saez
(2001) and Jacquet et al. (2013). They assume a ﬂat marginal tax rate to retrieve the
ability distribution when inverting the individual ﬁrst-order conditions. Since actual
tax schedules are not linear, this procedure may bias the estimate for the ability
distribution.
18 The calculations account for statutory tax rates, the general tax credit, the gen-
eral earned-income tax credit, the tax credit and earned-income tax credit for single
parents, the earned-income tax credit for working parents, health-insurance premi-
ums, housing subsidies, and subsidies to families with dependent children. We also
include employees’ social-security contributions. See Gielen et al. (2009) for a decom-
position of the EMTRs into income taxes, income-dependent tax credits, transfers and
subsidies.
19 Denote the effective direct marginal tax rate by td , the marginal indirect tax rate
by ti and the effective total marginal tax rate by te . We calculate the effective total
marginal tax rate as te =
td+ti
1+ti
.
20 We do not include the tax-deductibility of interest on mortgages and imputed
rent on owner-occupied housing. Evidence in Vermeulen and Rouwendaal (2007) sug-
gests that housing supply is nearly completely inelastic in The Netherlands. If housing
supply is largely inelastic, then larger demand for housing translates into higher hous-
ing prices, and leaves net, after-subsidy housing prices largely unaffected. The tax
treatment of housing then has little effect on effective marginal tax rates on labor
earnings.
21 Jacquet and Lehmann (2015) demonstrate that theMirrlees (1971) framework can
be generalized to allow for individuals differing in multiple characteristics as long as
they make only an earnings-supply choice. Their results carry over to Jacquet et al.
(2013) and thus our paper, see also Hendren (2014). This implies that all our deriva-
tions remain valid, except that we should take averages of all tax rates and elasticities
at each income level. Furthermore, as a robustness check we have calculated the social
welfare weights for different household types and we then averaged the social wel-
fare weights using population weights. This gives nearly the same results – available
on request – as in the baseline.
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paper are plotted for gross earnings in 2006. Moreover, px denotes
the x-th percentile of the earnings distribution. We observe that
EMTRs essentially follow the progressive statutory rates, with one
major exception. EMTRs are much higher than statutory rates close
to the mode of the income distribution (approximately 30 thousand
euro), which is where income-dependent subsidies are phased out,
in particular rent subsidies and subsidies for families with dependent
children.
To determine the PTRs, we ﬁrst calculate disposable income if
the individual works. Next, we determine disposable income if the
individual does not work. The PTR is calculated as in Brewer et al.
(2010) and OECD (2014): the participation tax rate equals 1 minus
the increase in disposable income as a fraction of gross wage income
if the individual moves from non-employment to work. In this way,
the PTR accounts for both taxes paid on gross wage income and the
loss in social-assistance beneﬁts (if applicable) when exiting non-
employment.22 We do not include unemployment beneﬁts in the
calculations of participation tax rates. Including the latter would
raise the average non-employment beneﬁt (b) with 3%,23 and the
resulting welfare weights are almost identical to the weights in the
base calibration (available on request).24
Fig. 2 gives a kernel estimate of the resulting PTRs. PTRs are rela-
tively low for low incomes because a substantial part of low-income
earners are secondary earners. Secondary earners typically do not
qualify for social assistance if they do not work because the income
of their partner is too high. Also, in the PTRs there is a ‘hump’ close
to the mode of the income distribution, because income-dependent
subsidies are phased out.
In the baseline, we calibrate the non-employment beneﬁt b and
the demogrant −T(0) such that the model-predicted average par-
ticipation tax equals the observed average participation tax and
the government budget constraint holds. Online Appendix D pro-
vides a comparison of the model-predicted participation taxes and
the observed participation taxes by income levels. The government
collects 9.5% of total labor earnings (i.e. total output) to ﬁnance
exogenous government consumption.25 With the government rev-
enue requirement set at 9.5% of total output, the government budget
balances under the current tax system with a non-employment
beneﬁt of approximately 9400 euro. This is in between the 2006
(disposable) social assistance level of 9316 euro for singles without
children and 15,760 euro for couples with children.
3.3. Intensive elasticity
We calibrate the elasticity on the intensive margin by adopting
the following utility function:
U =
c1−a
1 − a − c
(z/n)1+
1
e
1+ 1e
− 1(z > 0)v, a,c, e > 0, (13)
where a governs the marginal utility of consumption, e is the Frisch
elasticity of earnings supply on the intensive margin, and c is an
22 Here, we assume that individuals receive social-assistance beneﬁts when they do
notwork, provided that there is insuﬃcient income from a potential partner and insuf-
ﬁcient household wealth. In doing so, we follow oﬃcial rules of the tax authority and
the municipalities.
23 In 2006, 12% of the non-employed workers receives unemployment beneﬁts,
which are on average 26% higher than average social assistance beneﬁts (own calcu-
lations using the Labour Market Panel of Statistics Netherlands).
24 This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings in Immervoll et al. (2007, Table 5). They
ﬁnd that the welfare effects of a hypothetical tax reform are very similar when they
do or do not explicitly account for unemployment beneﬁts (next to social assistance).
25 As government consumption we count expenditures on public administration,
police, justice, defense and infrastructure minus non-tax revenues (from e.g. natural
gas) as a percentage of GDP, all taken from the Dutch National Accounts in Statistics
Netherlands (2015).
innocuous scaling parameter.26 z/n = l stands for earnings effort. v
is the idiosyncratic ﬁxed cost (or beneﬁt) of participation and I( • ) is
an indicator function.
The preference parameters a and e are calibrated to reproduce
the intensive-margin elasticities of the MIMIC model that is used
by CPB in the 2002 elections to simulate the long-run employment
effects of the reform proposals.27 We thus estimate the political
weights of political parties based on the same information regarding
behavioral responses of taxes as the political parties had in 2002. The
income-weighted uncompensated intensive-margin elasticity in our
simulations equals 0.2, which is the employment-weighted average
of the uncompensated elasticity in MIMIC across different demo-
graphic groups (Graaﬂand et al., 2001, Table 3.2). In our model, the
(un)compensated elasticity for the intensive margin is roughly con-
stant across the income distribution in the baseline calibration, see
online Appendix D.28 In addition, we assume that the average income
elasticity is −0.05, which corresponds to the employment-weighted
average in MIMIC across different demographic groups.29,30
3.4. Distribution of participation costs and participation elasticities
Finally, the distribution of participation costs h(v) determines the
participation elasticity in our model. We estimate this distribution
such that the average participation elasticity and the distribution
of participation elasticities by income in our model match with the
data. In the calibration of our model, we emulate the average partic-
ipation elasticity with respect to the wage rate in the MIMIC model
of CPB. Graaﬂand et al. (2001, Table 10.1, Columns 1–3) ﬁnd that
the aggregate participation response is about 80% of the aggregate
intensive-margin response (0.20). Hence, the average participation
elasticity is targeted at 0.16. To ensure that the model-predicted
elasticities decrease with income, we target the extensive-margin
elasticities by income quartiles to be consistent with the evidence in
Mastrogiacomo et al. (2017).
In contrast to our calibration, much of the empirical labor-supply
literature suggests that the extensive-margin response is larger
than the intensive-margin response (Heckman, 1993; Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999; Bargain et al., 2014a). However, recent evidence
by Chetty (2012) suggests that intensive-margin elasticities may
not be that different from extensive-margin elasticities. Further-
more, estimates of the elasticity of taxable income suggest much
larger intensive-margin responses than are documented in labor-
supply studies. For example, Jongen and Stoel (2016) present evi-
dence on the intensive-margin elasticity of taxable income for The
Netherlands that is comparable with extensive-margin responses in
labor supply.
26 The Frisch elasticity e is a parameter and should not be confused with the
compensated elasticity of earnings supply ecz .
27 See Graaﬂand et al. (2001) for a description of the MIMIC model, the calibration
and a large number of simulations.
28 Graaﬂand et al. (2001) do not report intensive-margin elasticities for different
income groups. Using data for the period 1999–2005,Mastrogiacomo et al. (2017) esti-
mate intensive-margin elasticities for hours worked that are declining in income for
singles and single parents, whereas intensive-margin elasticities for hours worked are
rather constant for primary and secondary earners in couples. Jongen and Stoel (2016)
estimate (intensive) taxable income elasticities using data for the period 1999–2005
for different income groups in The Netherlands. They ﬁnd that the elasticity of taxable
income is very similar across income groups, which is consistent with our model.
29 The uncompensated intensive-margin elasticity for primary earners (in couples),
secondary earners, childless singles, single parents and ‘older’ workers (55–64 years
of age, treated as a separate group) is 0.1, 0.25, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.15, respectively. The
income elasticities for the same demographic groups are assumed to be 0.0, −0.2,
−0.05, −0.1 and 0.0, respectively (Graaﬂand et al., 2001, pp. 76–78).
30 The estimates for the uncompensated elasticities and income elasticities are in
line with the estimates surveyed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Evers et al. (2008),
and Meghir and Phillips (2010), and with recent estimates of the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI) in the international literature and in The Netherlands, see Saez et al.
(2012) and Jongen and Stoel (2016).
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(a) Socialist party (SP) (b) Labor party (PvdA)
(c) Christian-democratic party (CDA) (d) Conservative-liberal party (VVD)
Fig. 3. Kernel estimate of marginal tax rates of proposed tax system by political party. Note: The dashed line gives a kernel estimate of marginal tax rates by income in the
proposed tax system of each of political party. The solid line represents marginal tax rates in the baseline tax system.
We estimate h(v) with a non-linear least-squares regression
using the participation elasticities and data on education-speciﬁc
employment rates. See Appendix C formore details on the estimation
procedure.
4. Proposals political parties
We focus on the four largest political parties in the Dutch par-
liament after the 2002 elections that ﬁt into the ‘left-wing’ and
‘right-wing’ taxonomy regarding political preferences for redistri-
bution: the left-wing socialist party (SP), the center-left labor party
(PvdA), the center-right Christian-democratic party (CDA) and the
right-wing conservative-liberal party (VVD). We do not consider
the populist party of Pim Fortuyn, because they did not submit a
tax-beneﬁt plan to CPB in the 2002 elections.31
Changes in the tax system result in changes in the EMTRs and
PTRs for each political party. Since the changes in EMTRs are the
main drivers of the changes in political weights we plot the EMTRs
31 Online Appendix E gives a brief introduction to the Dutch political system and the
Dutch political parties that participated in the 2002 elections. CPB (2002b) gives an
extensive overview of the proposed policy changes and the resulting effects (in Dutch).
Online Appendix F contains the detailed list of proposals for the tax system. Clearly,
the proposals of the political parties are not conﬁned to the tax-beneﬁt system. A brief
English summary of the full analysis of the election proposals can be found in CPB
(2002a). Furthermore, Graaﬂand and Ros (2003) and Bolhuis (2017) consider the pros
and cons of this unique Dutch exercise.
for each party and only discuss the changes in PTRs. Our calcula-
tions of changes in EMTRs also take into account proposed changes
in indirect taxes and corporate taxes. In line with the MIMIC model,
we assume that the incidence of taxes on ﬁrms is the same as for
the personal income tax.32 In particular, the change in the EMTR
due to a corporate tax change equals the percentage change in (ex
ante) corporate tax revenue as a fraction of the wage bill. We do
not account for the changes in taxes on capital income or wealth,
since The Netherlands has a dual tax system where labor and capi-
tal incomes are taxed separately and our focus is on the taxation of
labor income. This is in line with CPB (2002b), which also ignores the
effects of changes in capital income or wealth taxes on labor mar-
ket outcomes and the income distribution in Charting Choices. Online
Appendix F provides an exhaustive list of all tax and beneﬁtmeasures
taken by each political party and provides the scatterplots of EMTRs
on which our kernel estimates are based. This section only highlights
the main changes proposed by each political party.
We ﬁrst consider the proposed changes by the left-wing socialist
party (SP). Fig. 3 (panel a) plots the resulting kernel of EMTRs for
the SP in comparison to the baseline. The SP raises EMTRs across the
32 The extent to which business taxes are borne by ﬁrms, workers and consumers is
discussed in the public ﬁnance literature (Fuchs et al., 1998; de Mooij, 2005). A recent
meta-analysis by Melguizo and González-Páramo (2013) suggests that workers bear
74% of employers’ social-security contributions. Jacobs (2015) estimates that more
than 90% of employer taxes are borne by workers in The Netherlands.
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board due to higher marginal tax rates on labor income, higher indi-
rect taxes, and higher corporate taxes. The SP abolishes health-care
premiums, which is ﬁnanced by an increase in the ﬁrst-bracket rate
with 2.3 percentage points, and an increase in the second-, third-
and fourth-bracket rates by 3 percentage points. This shift from
health-care premiums to statutory tax rates raises EMTRs for mid-
dle and higher incomes. In the baseline, health-care premiums rise
up to an income of approximately 30 thousand euro, for incomes
beyond 30 thousand euro they are income independent, see Gielen
et al. (2009). The SP also proposes a ﬁfth, top bracket with a rate of
72% for gross incomes above 213,358 euro. This is not visible in our
graphs, since we only plot incomes up to 120 thousand euro. The
SP further introduces an additional earned-income tax credit (EITC).
This EITC is phased in between 100 and 130% of the annual mini-
mum wage of 16,484 euro in 2006. It reaches a maximum of 1,017
euro. It is completely phased out between 130% and 170% of the
minimum wage. The phase-in of the EITC limits the rise in marginal
tax rates at the bottom, but signiﬁcantly raises marginal tax rates
in the phase-out range, around 25 thousand euro. The SP raises the
(lump-sum) general child subsidy for lower incomes, cuts it in half at
45,000 euro, and completely withdraws it at 90,000 euro. Marginal
tax rates increase at these income thresholds. The SP raises social-
assistance beneﬁts by 5%. Furthermore, they introduce a tax credit for
non-workers which raises beneﬁts for the non-employed by another
3%.
Next, consider the tax-beneﬁt reforms proposed by the center-
left labor party (PvdA), see also Fig. 3 (panel b). Marginal tax rates
increase for the upper-middle and top incomes, which is due to
changing the pre-existing EITC and introducing a new, additional
EITC. The PvdA proposes to phase out the EITC – which is not phased
out in the baseline tax system – between 240 and 400% of the min-
imum wage. The additional EITC features a phase-in range between
90 and 100% of the minimum wage, where it reaches a maximum of
353 euro, and is phased-out between 180 and 240% of the minimum
wage. The PvdA also reforms the ﬁnancing of health insurance, but
this hardly affects the EMTRs. Finally, the PvdA raises indirect taxes,
but reduces corporate taxation at the same time. These changes
roughly cancel out.
Fig. 3 (panel c) gives the resulting kernel of EMTRs for the center-
right Christian-democratic party (CDA). The most notable change is
the rise in the marginal tax burden at the lower end of the income
scale due to targeting income support more at low-income fami-
lies by introducing income-dependent subsidies for health-care costs
and children and by raising housing subsidies. The CDA-proposals
also result in a more gradual phase-out of the overall system of
income-dependent subsidies for housing and dependent children.
This results in a noticeable drop in EMTRs around the mode of the
income distribution. Furthermore, the earlier start of the fourth tax
bracket raises EMTRs beyond the middle incomes. The CDA low-
ers the starting point of the fourth tax bracket by 4440 euro, which
effectively raises marginal tax rates over this income range. The CDA
increases the pre-existing EITC with 72 euro. The CDA reforms the
ﬁnancing of health insurance, but this hardly affects the EMTRs. The
CDA increases the refundable tax credit for non-working partners.
Furthermore, the CDA reduces corporate taxes by lowering employ-
ers’ social-security contributions and leaves indirect taxes virtually
unchanged.
Finally, we consider the proposals by the right-wing
conservative-liberal party (VVD), see Fig. 3 (panel d). Most notable
are the reductions in EMTRs for the middle- and top-income groups.
The VVD phases out income-dependent subsidies and tax credits
more slowly with income and it reduces the fourth bracket (top)
rate by 3 percentage points. EMTRs are lower than in the baseline
around the mode because the VVD increases the EITC (by 232 euro)
and because the VVD converts the income-dependent health-care
premiums to a lump-sum amount. Furthermore, the VVD does not
phase out the EITC, contrary to the left-wing parties SP and PvdA.
The VVD leaves beneﬁts for non-workers virtually unchanged, and
increases indirect and corporate taxes somewhat. The VVD abolishes
employer subsidies targeted at low-wage workers and abolishes the
exemption of corporate taxation for pension funds.
5. Political weights
5.1. Baseline
Fig. 4 gives the social welfare weights of the baseline tax system.
We observe that these weights are only roughly in line with a stan-
dard social welfare function featuring gradually diminishing welfare
weights. Indeed, although welfare weights are generally higher for
low- than for high-income individuals, they are not monotonically
declining in income and they are even slightly negative at high
income levels. Furthermore, the social welfare weight for the non-
employed is only slightly higher than that of the working poor.
This means that the government values redistribution towards these
groups roughly equally. Striking is the anomaly that the political
weights rise with income until the 25th percentile, then it reaches a
‘plateau’ until the mode of the earnings distribution around the 50th
percentile. Other studies also document that social welfare weights
need not be monotonically declining in income for several coun-
tries (Petersen, 2007; Blundell et al., 2009; Bargain and Keane, 2010;
Bargain et al., 2014b,c; Lockwood, 2016).
As explained in the theory section, the rise in welfare weights
towards the mode is a direct result of rising marginal tax rates
in the lower part of the income distribution in combination with
the increase in the elasticity of the local tax base hz. This pattern
of marginal tax rates can only be optimal when the government
attaches a higher social welfare weight to the middle-income groups
than to the low-income groups. This anomaly would imply that the
government redistributes ‘too much’ to middle incomes, as long as a
marginal euro is indeed worth more to the poor than to the middle-
income groups. Also, higher up the income distribution, close to
60,000 euro, political weights rise with income, because of the drop
and subsequent rise inmarginal tax rates around 60,000 euro. Appar-
ently, the government values an additional euro for individuals with
an income of 60,000 euro a bit more than an additional euro for indi-
viduals with a somewhat lower income. A second anomaly is that
Fig. 4. Social welfare weights by income in baseline tax system. Note: The solid line
represents social welfare weights as a function of income in the baseline tax sys-
tem. The dashed line represents social welfare weights if extensive-margin responses
are ignored. The colored areas decompose the social welfare weights into their main
determinants, see Eq. (7). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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top-income earners get a slightly negative political weight, since the
top tax rate is set somewhat beyond the Laffer rate, whichmaximizes
tax revenue. This result is also found in Denmark (Petersen, 2007)
and France (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012), but not in the US
(Hendren, 2014; Lockwood, 2016) and the UK (Bargain and Keane,
2010).
Proposition 2 in the theory section derived that there are four fac-
tors that explain the behavior of welfare weights with income. Fig. 4
decomposes the welfare weights into the contribution of these fac-
tors: the tax-base elasticity, non-constant marginal tax rates, and the
remaining terms: non-constant intensive elasticities, income effects
and participation effects. The red part in Fig. 4 reveals that the most
important driver of the social welfare weights is the elasticity of the
local tax base hz with income. Also, changes in marginal tax rates
matter as indicated by the blue part, but to a much lesser degree.
The baseline marginal tax schedule does not feature spikes, hence
these are not very important. This ﬁnding can be partly attributed to
the smoothing of individual marginal tax rates in our model. There
is a trade off in choosing the optimal bandwidth: a too small band-
width only generates noise in marginal tax rates, while a too large
bandwidth does not allow us to detect spikes in marginal tax rates.
Using a bandwidth of 3500 allows us to detect important spikes in
tax rates, while still being able to estimate clear patterns in social
welfare weights. Our results remain very similar using bandwidths
of 2000–5000 euro.
Income effects, participation responses and non-constant inten-
sive elasticities have a minor quantitative effect on political weights
as indicated by the tiny green part. Our ﬁndings thus imply that
results from earlier studies that ignore income effects and partici-
pation responses give a good approximation. Indeed, the dotted line
in Fig. 4 shows that the political weights are nearly the same when
the extensive margin is switched off completely. The reason that
the extensive margin has such a small effect on welfare weights
is that welfare weights depend on the extensive margin through
both the extensive-margin elasticity and the participation tax rate,
see the ﬁnal term of Eq. (7). In The Netherlands, the participation
tax rate increases with income, while the participation elasticity
declines with income, and both are relatively low. As a result, the
participation term is relatively small at all income levels, see also
Fig. 3 in online Appendix D.
5.2. Political parties
Fig. 5 reveals the political preference for income redistribution
for each political party. Each panel compares the political weights
of each party to the welfare weights from the pre-existing tax sys-
tem. Online Appendix G provides the decomposition of the political
weights for each party into its main determinants. No new insights
are obtained from this analysis compared to the baseline, hence it is
not discussed in this section.
As expected, all political parties roughly attach higher weights to
the poor than to the rich. The left-wing parties SP and PvdA attach a
relatively higher political weight to the poor than the right-wing par-
ties CDA and VVD. The reverse applies to the high-income earners.
The SP is the only party that proposes to raise beneﬁts for the non-
employed, which raises the average participation tax, and increases
the political weight for the non-employed. For all other parties,
the welfare weight for the non-employed remains nearly constant,
because they hardly change the average participation tax, see also
Eq. (9).
The SP exacerbates the ﬁrst anomaly of the baseline by raising the
political weight on incomes close to the middle-income groups even
further relative to the ‘working poor’. This is the result of the phase-
out of the EITC just above the minimum wage. The proposals of the
PvdA do not exacerbate the ﬁrst anomaly, but they do not reduce it
either. The proposals of the SP and PvdA both exacerbate the second
anomaly – that political weights are negative at the top – by push-
ing the top rate further beyond the Laffer rate. Note that the graph
excludes individuals earning more than 213,358 euro, who face a 72
percent top rate in the SP proposals. For the PvdA it is also surprising
that they attach a higher political weight to the ‘very rich’ (beyond
100,000 euro) than to the ‘rich’ (between 70,000 and 100,000 euro).
This is the result of the phase-out of the EITC programs. For the SP
we see a sudden rise and drop in the political weights for incomes
close to 90,000 euro, which is due to the withdrawal of the child sub-
sidy at that income level. This spike suggests that the SP cares much
more about familieswith children somewhat below 90,000 euro than
somewhat above 90,000 euro.
The proposals of the right-wing parties CDA and VVD do not
exacerbate, but reduce the pre-existing anomaly of giving a higher
political weight to middle-incomes than to the working poor. Espe-
cially the CDA reduces the political weights on the middle-income
groups, which is due to the stronger phase out of income-dependent
programs for rent, children and health care. Perhaps surprisingly, the
increase inmarginal tax rates at the bottom in the CDA program does
not result in higher political weights for the poor. The reason is that,
on the one hand, the marginal tax rate T′ indeed increases, which
leads – ceteris paribus – to a higher political weight at the bottom.
However, on the other hand, the marginal tax rates declines fast, i.e.,
T′ ′ 
 0, which leads – ceteris paribus – to a lower political weight at
the bottom, see also the theory section. Both effects cancel out. If the
CDAwants to increase the political weight of the poor, it shouldmore
slowly phase out the income-dependent programs with income, so
that T′ ′ becomes less negative (see also the decomposition for CDA in
online Appendix Fig. G.1, panel c). The VVD also slightly reduces the
ﬁrst anomaly, but the effects are less pronounced than for the CDA.
However, the VVD more strongly alleviates the second anomaly –
negative political weights for the rich – because it reduces the top
rate of the income tax.
Themost striking ﬁnding or our analysis is that all political parties
attach the highest political weight to middle incomes. What is also
striking is that most political parties hardly change the pre-existing
tax system. To quantify this status quo bias, we calculate the variance
of the political weights within and between political parties in online
Appendix H. We calculate the change in the variance of the politi-
cal weights relative to the variance of the weights in the baseline.
The change in the variance is just 2 to 3% for the PvdA and VVD, and
just a bit higher with 5% for the CDA. The most ‘radical’ changes are
found at the SP, which deviates 14% from the baseline. From this we
conclude that the political weights of the different political parties
hardly deviate from those in the pre-existing tax system.
Our results contrast sharply with the heated political rhetoric
during the elections. Indeed, political parties strongly proﬁle them-
selves as caring more about the poor (SP) or the rich (VVD) and make
promises that things will be very different once they are elected.
However, we ﬁnd that all parties mainly serve the large group of
middle-income voters. Furthermore, there appears to be a strong sta-
tus quo bias in the proposals of Dutch political parties, since their
proposals hardly change the net income distribution.
5.3. Robustness checks
Elasticity ‘optimists’ vs. ‘pessimists’. We check the robustness
of our ﬁndings using different assumptions regarding the behavioral
responses. Elasticity ‘optimists’ might argue that behavioral elastic-
ities are much smaller, and elasticity ‘pessimists’ might argue the
opposite (Stiglitz, 2000). In online Appendix I, we plot the politi-
cal weights for all political parties if we increase or decrease the
elasticities with 50%. In particular, in the high-elasticity scenario we
raise the compensated (uncompensated) elasticity to 0.38 (0.30), the
income elasticity to 0.08, and the participation elasticity to 0.23. In
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(a) Socialist party (SP) (b) Labor party (PvdA)
(c) Christian-democratic party (CDA) (d) Conservative-liberal party (VVD)
Fig. 5. Political weights by income for different political parties. Notes: The ﬁgures show political weights by income under the proposed tax system of each of the political parties
in our baseline model (dashed line). For comparison, the solid line represents social welfare weights in the baseline tax system.
the low-elasticity scenario we lower the compensated (uncompen-
sated) elasticity to 0.13 (0.10), the income elasticity to 0.03, and
the participation elasticity to 0.08. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst anomaly is
completely robust to changes in the elasticities, although the pat-
terns in political weights become less pronounced if we assume
low elasticities, as predicted from our theoretical analysis.33 There-
fore, if one believes that the left-wing parties are stronger elasticity
‘optimists’ than right-wing parties, it is still not possible to explain
why welfare weights increase towards the mode. However, elastic-
ity optimism could explain why left-wing parties raise top rates.
Indeed, the second anomaly – negative political weights – is pre-
served only under the high-elasticity scenario and disappears in the
low-elasticity scenario. Finally, the status quo bias becomes stronger
(weaker), i.e., deviations from the baseline become smaller (larger), if
we assume smaller (larger) extensive and intensive elasticities. How-
ever, the similarities across parties still remain more striking than
their differences.34
33 Lockwood andWeinzierl (2016) ﬁnd as well that the US patterns of social welfare
weights with income become more pronounced if elasticities are larger.
34 Furthermore, the differences between the structural model and the suﬃcient-
statistics approach (using the suﬃcient statistics for the baseline income distribu-
tion and elasticities) remain very small despite the different allocations, see also
online Appendix I.
Differences between household types. In the baseline we do not
distinguish between different household types. In Appendix J, we
calculate the political weights separately for childless singles, sin-
gle parents, primary earners without children, primary earners with
children, secondary earners without children, and secondary earn-
ers with children for the baseline and each political party. In these
calculations, we use group-speciﬁc income distributions, EMTRs and
PTRs, and extensive and intensive elasticities. The results show that
our ﬁrst anomaly – political weights that increase from low to mid-
dle incomes – is completely robust across different household types.
The second anomaly – negative political weights at the top – remains
for childless singles, single parents, and secondary earners, but the
political weights at the top are positive for primary earners because
of their relatively low intensive-margin elasticity. The results further
show that political parties hardly want to deviate from the status
quo, even if we look at the household level. Online Appendix J gives
a brief discussion of the results by household type.
Structural model vs. suﬃcient statistics. Online Appendix K
compares the political weights for all political parties derived under
the structural approach and the political weights that are obtained
using suﬃcient statistics. The suﬃcient-statistics approach keeps
the income distribution, employment rates and elasticities constant
at the baseline levels, and uses Eq. (7) to calculate the political
weights from the tax schedule proposed by the political parties.
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From this exercise we conclude that the structural model and the
suﬃcient-statistics approach provide very similar results for the
political weights. This implies that misspeciﬁcation of the structural
model is not likely to bias our ﬁndings. Moreover, one can forego
calibrating a complicated structural model, and derive the social wel-
fare weights of any tax system using suﬃcient statistics only as long
as tax changes remain small.
Transfers in kind. As a ﬁnal robustness check, we also verify
whether our results could be sensitive to redistribution via transfers
in kind. If the beneﬁts from in-kind transfers differ across income
groups, the EMTRs are affected, and our calculations of the political
weights could be biased. Our calculations already include the dis-
tributional impact of the government expenditures with the largest
distributional impact: health care and rent assistance. Kuhry and
Pommer (2006) provide estimates of the use of other in-kind trans-
fers by deciles of net disposable household income, such as public
transportation, museums, culture and arts, sport facilities, parks and
other recreational goods. Using these data, online Appendix L shows
that including in-kind transfers has only a small impact on EMTRs.
The changes in EMTRs range between −2.2 and +3.5% of disposable
household income. It is not feasible to adjust our baseline EMTRs
for the redistributive component of in-kind transfers, and recalcu-
late the social welfare weights, since we cannot map the changes
in EMTRs in terms of disposable household income into changes in
EMTRs in terms of individual gross earnings. Nevertheless, since the
EMTRs based on disposable household income change very little,
accounting for the redistributional component of in-kind transfers
will have only a small effect on estimated social welfare weights in
the baseline.
6. Discussion
Our analysis reveals that political weights are increasing until
modal income. In addition, top rates are at or slightly over the top
of the Laffer curve, implying that the Dutch tax system soaks the
rich. Moreover, the political weights look remarkably similar across
parties and compared to the welfare weights of the pre-existing
tax system. In particular, none of the political parties alleviate the
pre-existing anomalies in a signiﬁcant manner. The status quo bias
suggests that our ﬁndings are deeply rooted in Dutch redistribu-
tive politics. This section argues that most results can be explained
by political-economy considerations. We also consider a number of
caveats to this interpretation by discussing some economic interpre-
tations.
6.1. Political-economy considerations
Our results suggest that political-economy considerations could
play an important role in shaping the tax-beneﬁt system. Several
inverse optimal-tax studies have hinted at this. For example,
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012, p. 100) state that “[I]ndeed, tax-
beneﬁt schedules in the real world might result more from political
economy forces than from the pursuit of some well-deﬁned social
objective.” Bargain et al. (2014c) write in their conclusion: “[F]inally,
it is natural to think that real world tax-beneﬁt schedules result from
complex historical and political economy forces.” And Lockwood
and Weinzierl (2016, p. 46) note: “[A]t ﬁrst blush it appears that
the best empirical case can be made for the possibility that pol-
icy is sub-optimal; that bias in the political system makes policy
depart systematically from society’s true preferences.” By studying
the behavior of political parties, our study provides evidence for the
idea that political economy forces affect the tax-beneﬁt system. In
particular, our results are in line with theories that are prominent in
the political-economy literature.
Median voter models. The rise in political weights from the
working poor to the middle-income groups and the subsequent
sharp drop in these weights thereafter can be understood by median
voter models of income redistribution, see also Romer (1975),
Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981). Although the tax
system in The Netherlands is determined by coalition governments,
these political-economy models still have intuitive appeal since
political parties want to attract votes from the densely populated
middle-income groups. Röell (2012) and Brett and Weymark (2014)
generalize these models to the political economy of non-linear
income taxation using citizen-candidate models. Brett andWeymark
(2014) demonstrate that the median citizen candidate soaks both
the low-income and the high-income groups by setting a maxi-min
tax schedule for the individuals above her and maxi-max tax sched-
ules for individuals below her. This is what we ﬁnd empirically.
The patterns of the political weights – increasing to modal incomes
and decreasing thereafter – are also consistent with Director’s law
(Stigler, 1970), according to which the middle-income groups can
form a successful, stable political coalition to extract resources from
both the low-income and the high-income groups.
Probabilistic voting models. Probabilistic voting models could
explain why left-wing parties sacriﬁce on their preference to
redistribute income so as to gain voters on other, ideological
positions, see also Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Bierbrauer and
Boyer (2016). Alternatively, Roemer (1998, 1999) analyzes models
of two-dimensional political competition. He shows that the poor –
having a larger electorate – may not want to soak the rich through
redistributive tax systems if this helps to achieve larger electoral suc-
cess by attracting more voters on their non-economic, ideological
position.
Post-election concerns. Post-election considerations could
explain the large status quo bias that we observe in our analysis.
Indeed, political parties may not want to deviate too much from the
status quo given that they need to form a coalition government with
other political parties after elections are held. See also Persson and
Tabellini (2000).
Vested interests. The strong status quo bias could also be
explained by collective-action problems. Vested interests among
the middle-income groups could be effective in blocking welfare-
improving tax-beneﬁt reforms. See also Olson (1982).
6.2. Economic considerations
Although political-economy considerations offer a plausible
explanation for the anomalies we ﬁnd, we also want to point out
some potential economic explanations for our ﬁndings.
Non-welfarist motives. We do not consider non-welfarist
motives that might explain why the government and political par-
ties optimally set lower marginal tax rates for low-income workers.
If work is seen as intrinsically valuable to promote social inclu-
sion and dignity, or if the poor work too little to maximize their
well-being, then there are positive externalities associated with
work (Kanbur et al., 2006; Gerritsen, 2016). These externalities and
internalities imply that political weights of the poor are underesti-
mated. Similarly, fairness concerns may justify a lower, and possibly
even negative, marginal tax rates for the working poor (Fleurbaey
and Maniquet, 2006). The reason is that – for the same earning abil-
ity – the government does not wish to redistribute from individuals
that work hard to individuals that do not.
Multidimensional heterogeneity. Middle-income groups could
have higherweights if there is heterogeneity not only in earning abil-
ity, but also in the opportunity costs of work (Choné and Laroque,
2010). The middle-income groups may have higher opportunity
costs of work than the low-income groups, e.g. due to the pres-
ence of children. In that case, their average marginal welfare weight
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increases relative to the low-income groups – ceteris paribus. If
this effect is strong enough, it can counter the decline in wel-
fare weights arising from the heterogeneity in earning abilities. We
consider heterogeneity in opportunity costs of work a less likely
explanation for increasing welfare weights, since we ﬁnd the same
anomaly for all different household types – all having different
opportunity costs of work – in our robustness checks, see online
Appendix J.
Present bias. If workers suffer from ‘present bias’, and low-
income workers suffer more from present bias than middle- and
high-income workers, then optimal marginal tax rates can be
hump-shaped rather than U-shaped, see Lockwood (2016). Con-
sequently, welfare weights of the poor may be under-estimated.
Earnings-supply elasticities should follow a U-shape with income
if present bias is mainly concentrated at low-income workers
(Lockwood, 2016, pp. 23–24). However, this is not the relevant case
for The Netherlands. Empirical estimates of the labor-supply elastic-
ity and the elasticity of taxable income in The Netherlands do not
feature a U-shape with income (Jongen and Stoel, 2016; Mastrogia-
como et al., 2017). Therefore, we consider it unlikely that present bias
plays an important role.
Intra-household redistribution. By ignoring intra-household
redistribution, we could overestimate the social welfare weights for
the low-income earners, since secondary earners with low incomes
receive intra-household transfers from primary earners. Similarly,
the welfare weights for top income earners could be underestimated,
due to household transfers towards partners. However, corrections
for intra-household transfers cannot bemade, since there is no infor-
mation on intra-household transfers and there is not yet an inverse
optimal-tax method for families.35
Externalities and internalities top income earners. Political
parties may want to set higher top rates for non-redistributive rea-
sons to correct negative externalities associated with ‘rat races’
(Akerlof, 1976), ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ (Layard, 1980), inter-
nalities associated with working too hard (Gerritsen, 2016), to mit-
igate rent seeking by top executives (Piketty et al., 2014) or to
alleviate democratic failures as a result of wealth concentration
(Stiglitz, 2000). In these cases, we also underestimate the political
weights for top income earners. Most behavioral arguments could
be relevant, also in The Netherlands.36 However, the Dutch evidence
is not consistent with rent seeking of top executives or democratic
failures resulting from wealth concentration. In particular, concen-
tration of top incomes in The Netherlands is among the lowest in
the world and has not increased in recent decades, see Atkinson
and Salverda (2005) and the World Top Income Database. More-
over, party ﬁnancing in The Netherlands is not important from an
international perspective (Poguntke et al., 2016). Furthermore, CEO
compensation is relatively low in The Netherlands.37
Lifetime versus yearly income. One may interpret our model as
capturing the trade off between equity in lifetime income (consump-
tion) and eﬃciency. However, the focus in our analysis is on annual,
rather than lifetime income. This is more natural given that the elec-
tion programs of political parties focus on annual rather than lifetime
income. Moreover, CPB only reports the effects on annual income.
35 See Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), Apps and Rees (1998), Schroyen (2003), Kleven
et al. (2009) and Alesina et al. (2011) for the optimal taxation of families.
36 On the other hand, Alesina et al. (2005) argue that rivalry in leisure (a ‘leisure
multiplier’) exacerbates the distortions of income taxation. Consequently, top tax rates
could also create negative externalities and should then optimally be set lower.
37 Fernandes et al. (2012) show that CEO compensation in The Netherlands (on aver-
age 2.4 million dollar) is below the average of 14 Western economies (2.8 million
dollar on average for the non-US countries) and much below CEO compensation in
the US (on average 5.5 million dollar). Fernandes et al. (2012) also report corporate
governance indicators that are much higher in The Netherlands than in the US or the
UK.
It is not clear in which directions our results would change if we
focused on lifetime income instead of annual income, which is an
interesting extension for future research.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have used the inverse optimal-tax method to
reveal the redistributive preferences of Dutch political parties. We
exploit unique data on the proposed tax system of Dutch polit-
ical parties in their election programs. Only part of our ﬁndings
conﬁrm prior expectations. First, all political parties roughly give
a higher political weight to the poor than to the rich. Second, left-
wing parties generally give a higher political weight to the poor
and a lower political weight to the rich than right-wing parties
do. We uncover two important anomalies in the current tax sys-
tem and all election programs of Dutch political parties. Political
weights are found to be increasing from the working poor to the
middle class. This anomaly is completely robust. Second, the polit-
ical weight of the rich is slightly negative, hence Dutch political
parties want to ‘soak the rich’ completely. However, this ﬁnding is
sensitive to the elasticity of taxable income for top-income earn-
ers. Moreover, the left-wing parties increase the political weight
of the middle class even further and reduce the political weight
of the top-income earners even more below zero. The right-wing
parties do the reverse: they reduce the welfare weights of the mid-
dle classes, while raising the political weight for the top-income
earners. A striking ﬁnding is also the closeness of the political
weights to weights in the pre-existing tax system and similarity
of political weights across political parties. Dutch political prefer-
ences for income redistribution are therefore deeply rooted in a
political status quo. Political-economy considerations offer a plau-
sible explanation for the anomalies that we uncover. Indeed, our
results suggest that the political process plays an important role
in shaping the tax-beneﬁt system.
We conclude with some directions for future research. Our
suﬃcient-statistics approach foregoes the need to develop complex
structural models and can be readily applied to estimate social wel-
fare weights for other countries and time periods using information
only on tax rates, income distributions, and behavioral elastici-
ties. Furthermore, by explicitly deriving social welfare weights from
revealed political preferences, governments can make interpersonal
welfare comparisons, since social welfare weights can be used to
measure the distributional costs and beneﬁts of policies in social
cost-beneﬁt analysis, see also Hendren (2014).
Moreover, future research could extend this paper to analyze the
joint taxation of labor and capital income to derive welfare weights
in suchmore realisticmodels. Similarly, ourmodel could be reframed
in terms of household taxation as in Kleven et al. (2009). Also, our
research can be extended to develop inverse optimal-tax models
to estimate social welfare weights for different household types
(e.g. singles/couples or households with/without children). Further,
future research can derive social welfare weights using the fairness
approach to optimal taxation of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006).
The political-economy models with optimal taxation, such as the
ones analyzed by Brett and Weymark (2014), can be inverted to
derive political weights. Finally, our analysis rests on the assumption
that by showing their budgets, political parties reveal their prefer-
ences. However, just like individuals, political parties may be subject
to behavioral biases. For example, politicians may have diﬃculties
understanding the difference between marginal and average tax
rates, just like voters. If behavioral political biases are important,
then revealed political preferences are no longer informative of true
political preferences for income redistribution. Future research may
thus develop ‘behavioral political economics’ and apply this to the
inverse-optimum approach.
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Appendix A. Proof Proposition 1
A.1. Optimal non-linear tax schedule
In Jacquet et al. (2013) the government minimizes total resources subject to a set of constraints on the distribution of utilities and incentive
compatibility constraints. Eq. (28) of Jacquet et al. (2013) gives the optimal marginal tax rate for working individuals:
T ′(zn)
1 − T ′(zn) =
an
ecn
(∫ n¯
n 1 − gm + gm T
′(zm)
1−T ′(zm) − fTzm
tzm
1−tzm
)
k˜(m)dm
K˜(n¯) − K˜(n)
K˜(n¯) − K˜(n)
nk˜(n)
, ∀n. (A.1)
In this expression, an ≡ ∂zn∂n nzn > 0 denotes the elasticity of gross earnings zn with respect to ability n. ecn ≡ − ∂zn∂T ′
1−T ′(zn)
zn
> 0 is the com-
pensated elasticity of taxable income. gn = − (1 − T ′(zn)) ∂zn∂q ≥ 0 is the income effect on gross earnings of workers with ability n, where
q is an exogenous change in income. k˜(n) ≡ ∫ un−v(b)v k(n,v)dv, denotes the density of individuals with ability n that participate in the labor
market. K˜(n) is the fraction of employed workers with ability less than or equal to n in the population, where K˜(n) ≡ ∫ nn k˜(m)dm. Finally,
fTzm ≡ k(n,un−v(b))k˜(n) uc( • ) (z − (T(z) + b)) > 0 is the participation elasticity with respect to a change in participation taxes.
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It will be impossible to bring Eq. (A.1) to the data, since ability and disutility of participation are unobservable. Hence, we cannot mea-
sure K˜(n). Moreover, while the monotonicity of the optimal second-best allocation guarantees a one-to-one mapping between the ability of
employed workers and their gross earnings, such a mapping does not exist for the non-employed. However, Bayes’ theorem allows us to
decompose K˜(n) into the distribution of income among the employed and the employment rate. Since both are observable from the data, we
can rewrite Eq. (A.1) in terms of suﬃcient statistics. In particular, note that by deﬁnition we can write K˜(n) as:
K˜(n) =
∫ n
n
∫ un−v(b)
v
k(m,v)dvdm ≡ P(ni ≤ n, ei = 1), ∀n, (A.2)
where ei is an indicator variable, which takes value 1 if individual i is employed, and zero if the individual is not employed. P(ni ≤ n, ei = 1)
denotes the probability that a random individual i in the population has an ability ni smaller than or equal to n and is employed. In words: the
fraction of the population that is employed and has ability smaller than n equals the joint probability that a random individual is employed
and has ability smaller than or equal to n. By Bayes’ theorem we can rewrite this probability as:
P(ni ≤ n, ei = 1) = P(ni ≤ n|ei = 1)P(ei = 1), ∀n, (A.3)
where P(ni ≤ n|ei = 1) denotes the probability that a random individual i in the population has ability smaller than or equal to ni conditional on
being employed, and P(ei = 1) is the unconditional probability that a random person i is employed. Note that P(ei = 1) equals the employment
rate E ≡ ∫ n¯n ∫ un−v(b)v k(m,v)dvdm. Using K˜(n) = ∫ nn ∫ un−v(b)v k(m,v)dvdm, the conditional probability P(ni ≤ n|ei = 1) is thus equal to:
P(ni ≤ n|ei = 1) =
∫ n
n
∫ un−v(b)
v k(m,v)dvdm∫ n¯
n
∫ un−v(b)
v k(m,v)dvdm
. (A.4)
Since there is a monotonic mapping between ability n and gross earnings zn among employed individuals, the probability that an individ-
ual has ability smaller than n conditional on employment equals the probability that an individual has an income below zn conditional on
employment: P(ni ≤ n|ei = 1) ≡ P(zi ≤ zn|ei = 1). Hence, we can decompose K˜(n) entirely into observables F(zn) and E:
K˜(n) = F(zn)E, ∀n, zn. (A.5)
Further, to ﬁnd an expression for k˜(n) in terms of observables, take the derivative of Eq. (A.5) with respect to ability:
k˜(n) ≡ dK˜(n)
dn
=
dF(zn)
dn
E = f (zn)
dzn
dn
E = f (zn)an
zn
n
E, ∀n, zn. (A.6)
In the second step, we have used the deﬁnition of K˜(n) and an, and the fact that the overall employment rate is independent of ability. We
can simplify Eq. (A.1) by substituting Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) to arrive at:
T ′(zn)
1 − T ′(zn) =
1
ecn
(∫ z¯
zn
1 − gm + gm T ′(zm)1−T ′(zm) − fTzm
tzm
1−tzm
)
f (zm)dzm
1 − F(zn)
1 − F(zn)
f (zn)zn
, ∀zn, (A.7)
38 Note that we use slightly different deﬁnitions of the income and participation elasticities than Jacquet et al. (2013). In particular, their income elasticity is deﬁned as
gn = − ∂zn∂q ≥ 0 and their participation elasticity is deﬁned as: jn = k(n,un−b)k˜(n) uc( • ).
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where z¯ ≡ zn¯, and we have used the fact that F(z¯) = 1. Moreover, for the term inside the integral we have used that Eq. (A.6) can be rewritten
as k˜(n)dn = f (zn)dznE. Note that by the substitution rule for integration, the bounds of the integrals change.
We can write Eq. (A.7) completely in terms of earnings z. Due to the monotonic mapping from n to zn there exists (with slight abuse of
notation) an xzn such that xzn ≡ xn for all parameters x = {g,g, j, ec} and for all zn. In addition, we can rewrite the expression for any particular
z ∈ [z, z¯], because Eq. (A.7) holds for all zn ∈ [z, z¯]. Using these results and dropping the n-subscripts allows us to write expression (A.7) as
Eq. (5) in the main text.
A.2. Optimal participation tax
The optimality condition for the participation tax is given by Eq. (18d) in Jacquet et al. (2013):
(g0 − 1)
∫ n
n
∫ v¯
un−v(b)
k(n,v)dvdn =
∫ n
n
(T(zn) + b) v′(b)k (n,un − v(b))dn. (A.8)
Note that this equation is, again, written in terms of the unobservable joint density function k(n,v).
To express the equation in terms of the income distribution among workers and the employment rate, note that the non-employment rate
equals 1 − E = ∫ nn ∫ v¯un−v(b) k(n,v)dvdn. Moreover, using the deﬁnition of the participation elasticity with respect to a change in beneﬁts, i.e.,
fbz ≡ k(n,un−v(b))k˜(n) v
′(b) (z − (T(z) + b)), we ﬁnd:
k (n,un − v(b)) =
fbzn k˜(n)
v′(b) (zn − (T(zn) + b)) . (A.9)
Consequently, we can write the optimal participation tax as:
(g0 − 1)(1 − E) =
∫ n
n
fbzn
tzn
1 − tzn
k˜(n)dn. (A.10)
Now, use k˜(n) = f (zn) dzndn E, change the variables of integration and drop the subscripts n to arrive at Eq. (6) for the optimal participation tax in
the main text.
Appendix B. Proof Proposition 2
Using Leibniz’ rule we can differentiate the optimal income tax Eq. (5) with respect to z:
1
f (z)
d
(
T ′(z)
1−T ′(z) e
c
zf (z)z
)
dz
=eczz
d
(
T ′(z)
1−T ′(z)
)
dz
+
zT ′(z)
1 − T ′(z)
decz
dz
+
eczT
′(z)
f (z) (1 − T ′(z))
d (f (z)z)
dz
,
= (hz + nz) ecz
T ′(z)
1 − T ′(z) + e
c
z
zT ′′(z)
(1 − T ′(z))2
. (B.1)
Use Eq. (B.1) to arrive at Eq. (7) in the main text. Finally, reorder Eq. (A.10) to arrive at Eq. (9) in the main text.
Appendix C. Calibration of the model
C.1. Social welfare weights in terms of structural parameters
In this Appendix we express the social welfare weights in terms of structural parameters. Once we have calibrated the structural model,
we can easily calculate the social welfare weights. After that, we describe the calibration procedure to ﬁt the structural model to the data. This
Appendix speaks of social welfare weights to connect our model to the literature. Our application to political parties adopts the terminology
of political weights to clearly distinguish the two.
Eq. (A.1) gives the formula for the optimal tax schedule. By inverting this expression we can solve for the welfare weights of working
individuals in terms of structural model parameters:
gn = 1+ gn
T ′(zn)
1 − T ′(zn) − f
T
n
tzn
1 − tzn
+
1
k˜(n)
d
[
ecm
am
T ′(zm)
1−T ′(zm)mk˜(m)
]
dm
, ∀n. (C.1)
In addition, we ﬁnd the welfare weight for non-participants by solving Eq. (A.10) for g0:
g0 = 1+
∫ n
n f
b
n
tzn
1−tzn k˜(n)dn
1 − E . (C.2)
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We express the behavioral elasticities in Eqs. (C.1) and (C.2) in terms of structural parameters as follows:39
an =
n
zn
(
ul
n2
+ lull
n2
)
ull
n2
+ (1 − T ′(zn))2ucc − T ′ ′(zn)uc
, (C.3)
gn =
(1 − T ′(zn))2ucc
ull
n2
+ (1 − T ′(zn))2ucc − T ′ ′(zn)uc
, (C.4)
ecn =
ul
nzn
ull
n2
+ (1 − T ′(zn))2ucc − T ′ ′(zn)uc
, (C.5)
fTn =
k (un − v(b),n)
k˜(n)
(zn − T(zn) − b)uc, (C.6)
fbn =
v′(b)
uc
fTn . (C.7)
Before we turn to the calibration algorithm, we employ a number of structural assumptions to simplify the expression for the social welfare
weights in Eq. (C.1). First, under the speciﬁc form of our utility function, Eq. (13), e
c
n
an
in Eq. (C.1) simpliﬁes to:
ecn
an
=
e
1+ e
. (C.8)
Second, we assume n and v are distributed independently. This allows us to write k(n,v) ≡ h(n)kˆ(v) where h(n) is the unconditional
probability density function of n and kˆ(v) is the probability density function of v. Using the deﬁnition of k˜(n), we can therefore write:
k˜(n) ≡
∫ un−v(b)
−∞
k(n,v)dv = h(n)
∫ un−v(b)
−∞
kˆ(v)dv = h(n) Kˆ(un − v(b)) , (C.9)
where Kˆ(v) ≡ ∫ v−∞ kˆ(v′)dv′ is the cumulative density function of participation costs. This, in turn, allows us to simplify the expression for the
participation elasticity as follows:
fTn =
kˆ (un − v(b))
Kˆ (un − v(b))
(zn − T(zn) − b)uc. (C.10)
Using Eqs. (C.8) and (C.9), we can rewrite the ﬁnal term in Eq. (C.1) in the following way:
1
k˜(n)
d
[
ecm
am
T ′(zm)
1−T ′(zm)mk˜(m)
]
dm
=
1
h(n)Kˆ (un − v(b))
d
[
e
e+1
T ′(zm)
1−T ′(zm)mh(m) Kˆ(um − v(b))
]
dm
=
e
(1 + e)
T ′(zn)
1 − T ′(zn)
(
n
Kˆ (un − v(b))
d Kˆ(um − v(b))
dm
+ hnn
)
+
ne
(1 + e)
d
[
T ′(zm)
1−T ′(zm)
]
dm
, (C.11)
where hnn ≡ 1+ dh(m)dm nh(n) is the local elasticity of the tax base. The ﬁrst step follows from substituting Eqs. (C.8) and (C.9), and the second step
follows from application of the product rule.
C.2. Algorithm
The algorithm that calculates the political weights for the political parties uses four steps.
1. Calculate the allocation {zn, cn} associated with the baseline marginal tax rates and income levels {T(zn), b}.
2. Calibrate the parameters of the utility function {a, e,c}, and estimate the conditional distribution of earnings ability for the working
population h(n|ei = 1) on the baseline data.
3. Estimate the distribution of participation costs kˆ(v) and the distribution of earnings ability for the entire population h(n), again using
baseline data.
4. Calculate the political weights gn and g0 based on the tax systems proposed by political parties using Eqs. (C.1) and (C.2).
39 See Eqs. (7), and (25a–c) in Jacquet et al. (2013) for the derivation, where we assume u(cn , zn ,n) = u(cn , ln) and ucl = 0, which is consistent with our utility function in Eq. (13).
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To determine the allocation and to ﬁnd the tax function in the current tax system T(zn) we estimate a kernel regression of income on
marginal tax rates to obtain a smoothed estimate of the marginal tax rate T′(zn) at each income level. We subsequently calculate the total tax
burden at each income level, excluding T(0), using
∫ zn
zn
T ′(zn)dzn. We employ the government budget constraint Eq. (4) to ﬁnd T(0) and b, where
T(0) and b are chosen such that i) the government budget constraint is satisﬁed, and ii) the average model-predicted participation tax rate
equals the average participation tax rate calculated by CPB in the baseline. We then calculate total tax burdens T(zn) and obtain cn = zn −T(zn).
In steps 2 and 3 of our algorithm we employ the baseline allocation to calibrate u(cn, ln), h(n) and kˆ(v). We ﬁrst choose starting values for
the utility parameters a, c and e. We then ﬁnd the ability level of each individual in the sample by inverting their ﬁrst-order condition, see also
Saez (2001). This provides us with the following solution for individual ability in terms of their income level zn, the tax function T(zn) and the
utility parameters a, c and e:
n =
c
e
1+e z
1
1+e
n (zn − T(zn))
ae
1+e
(1 − T ′(zn))
e
1+e
. (C.12)
To ﬁnd the distribution of earnings ability we estimate a kernel density function for ability. We will denote this distribution by
h(n|ei = 1), which is the distribution of ability conditional on employment. We approximate the top 10% of the ability distribution with a
Pareto distribution. Since the top of the income distribution follows a Pareto distribution with a Pareto parameter of 3.158, it follows that the
Pareto parameter for the ability distribution at the top is given by ann = 3.158(1 + e
u), see Saez (2001, p. 222). When we paste the Pareto tail
to the ability distribution, we scale the resulting distribution by two constants which ensure that i) the probability density function of ability
is continuous around the cutoff, and ii) the integral over the distribution equals 1. We evaluate the resulting distribution of ability at 750 lin-
early spaced points between the lowest and the highest ability level in our sample. Note that the estimated ability distribution at this stage is
conditional on employment, since we cannot infer earnings ability for non-participants in the labor market. We denote the ability distribution
conditional on employment by h(n|ei = 1).
Next, we calculate the compensated and income earnings supply elasticities for all working individuals using Eqs. (C.4) and (C.5). The
average earnings supply and income elasticities among workers are given by e¯c =
∫
ecnh(n|ei = 1)dn and g¯ =
∫
gnh(n|ei = 1)dn. We iterate
over different values of a, c and e, while updating the ability distribution through Eq. (C.12) at each iteration until: i) the model produces
average elasticities that are equal to their empirical estimates, and ii) the average ability level equals the average income level in the sample.
Although ecn and gn may theoretically depend on ability as well as on the tax schedule with our utility function, we ﬁnd that the elasticities are
roughly constant in both dimensions in our calibrated model, see online Appendix D.
In the third step, we estimate the distribution of participation costs kˆ(v). Ideally, we would like to estimate the parameters of kˆ(v) using
ability-speciﬁc employment rates and extensive-margin elasticities. Unfortunately, these data are not available. Instead, we use empirical
evidence from Mastrogiacomo et al. (2017) to target extensive-margin elasticities by income quartile, ensuring that the average extensive-
margin elasticity equals 0.16 consistent with MIMIC.40 Since there is a one-to-one mapping between income and ability in our model, we can
employ this information to calibrate kˆ(v).
The empirical literature uses a slightly different deﬁnition of the extensive-margin elasticity than our theoretical model. In our model, fTn
measures the elasticity of participationwith respect to a change in the participation tax rate. Instead, Graaﬂand et al. (2001) andMastrogiacomo
et al. (2017) report the elasticity of participation with respect to a change in the wage rate n, fnn ≡ dEndn nEn . To ensure the distribution kˆ(v) is
consistent with these empirical estimates we adopt this deﬁnition in our calibration. Afterwards, we use the calibrated distribution kˆ(v) to
calculate fTn to calculate the welfare weights.
We calibrate our model to match empirical estimates as follows. The model-predicted average extensive-margin elasticity for individuals
between ability level n1 and n2 is given by:
fnn1,n2 =
∫ n2
n1
fnn h(m)dm∫ n2
n1
h(m)dm
. (C.13)
We compare the predicted elasticity to the empirical estimate for this elasticity in each quartile.
Moreover, we have education-speciﬁc employment rates for 5 different levels of education. When we assume there is also a one-to-one
relationship between education and ability, the data provide us with the empirical employment rate at 5 points in the ability distribution. Our
model predicts the following ability-speciﬁc employment rate:
En = Kˆ (un − v(b)) . (C.14)
Hence, the predicted average employment rate between ability level n1 and n2 is given by:
E¯n =
∫ n2
n1
Kˆ (um − v(b))h(m)dm∫ n2
n1
h(m)dm
. (C.15)
The predicted employment rates by education level can, again, be compared to participation rates for the corresponding education group.
Overall we thus have 4 data points on the extensive-margin elasticity and 5 data points on the employment rates. The distribution of
participation costs h(v) is assumed to follow a non-standardized t-distribution with mean l, scale-parameter s , and degrees of freedom m.41
We estimate parameters l, s , and m of kˆ(v) using a non-linear least squares regression, where the error term consists of the difference between
actual, and model-predicted extensive-margin elasticities and participation rates.
40 To be more precise, we take the empirical elasticities by quartile reported in Mastrogiacomo et al. (2017), divide them by the average elasticity and multiply them with 0.16.
41 When the degrees of freedom converge to inﬁnity, the distribution converges to a normal distribution with mean l and standard deviation s . Due to the extra parameter the
non-central t-distribution allows us to obtain a better ﬁt of employment rates and elasticities than with the normal distribution.
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The predicted elasticities depend on h(n) rather than h(n|ei = 1), since extensive-margin elasticities depend both on responses of employed
and non-employed individuals. We initially assume that h(n|ei = 1) = h(n). Subsequently, we use the estimated kˆ(v) to retrieve the ability
distribution h(n) as follows. Let ei be an indicator equal to 1 when random individual i is employed. Then, we ﬁnd using Bayes’ theorem:
P(ei = 1|n)h(n) = h(n|ei = 1)P(ei = 1). (C.16)
The probability of being employed, conditional on employment is the ability-speciﬁc employment rate: P(ei = 1|n) = En. The unconditional
employment probability is the overall employment rate P(ei = 1) = E. We can thus rewrite Eq. (C.16) to arrive at:
h(n) =
h(n|ei = 1)E
En
, (C.17)
which gives us an updated estimate of h(n). With this updated value we rerun the algorithm to determine updated values of l, s and m. The
loop ends when the absolute value of the update on the parameters is below 0.1%. After step 3 we have thus calibrated u(cn, ln), h(n), and kˆ(v).
The ﬁnal step of the algorithm calculates political weights using Eq. (C.1) for the welfare weights of the employed, and Eq. (C.2) for the
non-employed.
Appendix D–L. Supplementary data
Appendices D–L to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.002.
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